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Abstract
In this paper, we study coordinated attacks launched by
multiple malicious agents and the problem of detecting ma-
licious groups of attackers. The paper proposes a formal
method and an algorithm for detecting action interference
between users. It has to be pointed out that some members
of a malicious group may not necessarily perform illegal ac-
tions, for example, they can prepare and organize an attack
without taking active part in the actual attack execution. In
addition, members of a malicious group may not necessar-
ily know each other. The method we propose tries to solve
these problems by building a coordination graph which in-
cludes all users who, in some way or another, cooperate
with each other, i.e., the maximal malicious group of coop-
erating users including not only the executers of the attack
but also their assistants. The paper also proposes formal
metrics on coordination graphs that help differentiate cen-
tral from peripheral attackers.
1. INTRODUCTION
Cooperation and coordination have been subjects of con-
tinuous interest in multiagent systems for many years. A
large number of architectures, protocols, algorithms, and
mechanisms have been developed, allowing a group of in-
telligent agents to work together towards a common goal.
Instead of focusing on the problem of how to make agents
better cooperate, this paper addresses the problem of detect-
ing malicious cooperation, that is, detecting a group of ad-
versarial agents.
Coordinated attacks launched by multiple adversarial
agents are usually beyond the power of a single attacker.
Such attacks are normally implemented by organizations
having the power and resources to train and equip a task
force capable of attacking and destroying information in-
frastructures from both afar and on location. A recent CERT
report [17] concludes that modern attack tools are rapidly
evolving, and are becoming more sophisticated. Unlike ear-
lier attacks, launched by a single attacker against a single
victim, recent attacks are better coordinated and more difﬁ-
cult to discover.
Detecting coordinated attacks and adversarial groups is
of special importance to critical infrastructure protection
[1]. Because of the magnitude of the potential damage, one
cannot rely on the detect-respond paradigm which is cur-
rently used by Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs). If a criti-
cal infrastructure is taken down, the effect will be more than
apparent, the damage will be devastating, and IDSs will be
of little help. Instead of IDSs, one needs systems for early
detection and prevention of attacks against critical infras-
tructures.
In a world of ubiquitous computing, we can expect a co-
ordinated attack to include not only humans, but also intel-
ligent software agents acting on behalf of humans, intelli-
gent sensors, and various intelligent handheld or embedded
devices acting as a team by resource sharing, task alloca-
tion, and synchronization. A recent study by Honeynet re-
searchers [36] reveals that criminals (commonly known as
carders) make use of software robots called bots to auto-
mate merchant site identiﬁcation, target exploitation, card
validation, and card veriﬁcation. The bots were capable of
remotely accessing a common database containing vulnera-
ble target merchant websites. The robots also had access to
a database of known exploits that could be used to compro-
mise a website.
Most previous work on plan and goal recognition has as-
sumed cooperative or neutral agents [22, 33, 7, 6, 21]. Co-
hen, Perrault and Allen [8] distinguish between two kinds of
plan recognition: keyhole and intended. In keyhole recogni-
tion, the agents being monitored are neutral to the recog-
nition process. For example, they may not care or may not
be aware that their actions have been observed. In intended
recognition, agents take actions intending to be understood.
More recent work on adversarial modelling goes further,
by assuming that the adversary may try to conceal some
of their actions [16, 15]. The applicability of such models,
however, is limited to well-deﬁned settings in which the ad-
versary is well known and can be recognized (the opponent
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team, for example), and his top-level goals and intentions
are known (to win the game, to win an auction, to defeat
our team, etc.). In such settings, the adversary does not try to
hide or change his identity, the conﬂict is visible, and the in-
centives are more or less known. Examples include robocup
soccer, games playing, or military simulations.
Many real-life problems, such as computer secu-
rity, physical security, information warfare, forensics re-
search, and antiterrorism, are much more complex. A com-
puter hacker, for example, tries to conceal both his identity
and his actions. He could be either an unauthorized out-
sider, or a legitimate insider who has worked several years
for a company. A hacker can spoof his identity and imper-
sonate another individual as in the notorious Mitnick at-
tack [30]. The hacker’s motives are not always identiﬁable.
An attacker may steal a database of credit cards for an eco-
nomic proﬁt, a ﬁrm may launch a DoS attack against
a competitor’s website, and a punk may deface a web-
site for personal satisfaction, or for the sake of proving
his hacking skills. Examples of using malicious intelli-
gent agents for distributed coordinated attacks are given in
[3, 4, 5].
Several alert correlation methods have been proposed
in the literature. Some of them [37, 40] correlate alerts
based on similarity between alert attributes. Other correla-
tion methods [12, 13] rely on a set of known attack scenar-
ios, where some of the scenarios are dynamically learned.
Correlation attack languages [14, 40, 25] have recently been
proposed, in an attempt to specify relationships among at-
tacks and detect coordinated attacks. Correlation languages
use semantically rich alerts generated by an intrusion de-
tection system in order to recognize the global state of
the system. Attack graphs and trees are another class of
tools used to describe logical steps and strategies behind at-
tacks. Philips et al. [31] proposed a graph-based vulnerabil-
ity model, where nodes identify system states, and arcs rep-
resent atomic attacks. Similar models have been used by Jha
et al. [20, 19] and Schneier [35].
Although effective for correlating some alerts, most cor-
relation methods cannot discover the causal relationships
between alerts. As the very name of coordinated attacks
suggests, the attack steps usually follow a special causal or-
der. For example, one step can prepare or modify the result
of another. It is only recently that attempts have been made
to use causal correlation of alerts. Templeton and Levitt [39]
proposed a method in which the postconditions of an ac-
tion are used as preconditions of another action. Methods
that correlate alerts based on the prerequisites and conse-
quences of intrusions have been developed by Ning et al.
[27, 29, 28], and Cuppens et al. [11, 10].
The problem we raise in this paper is the following.
Given a security mechanism that detects a single malicious
action, how can one identify all users which directly or in-
directly contribute to a joint malicious activity? In other
words, we want to identify all members of a malicious
group and their actions.
To illustrate the problem, think of the following example.
Consider a large crowd (users, processes, hosts, threads)
with a few attackers hiding inside and executing a coordi-
nated attack plan. Due to the large crowd, it is practically
impossible to discern individual attackers, many of which
could be performing seemingly innocuous or perfectly le-
gitimate actions. Once the attack succeeds it is clear who
the attackers are, but at this point it is too late to make a dif-
ference.
Another scenario includes a very long sequence of le-
gitimate actions performed by different users preparing for
a very short attack consisting of one or two atomic actions.
The long sequence by itself may not constitute an attack sig-
nature, because it might be applied in perfectly legal alter-
native scenarios.
One problem with current intrusion detection systems
is that they detect only the immediate executers of an at-
tack and not their assistants, i.e. the agents who prepared
the attack by taking perfectly legal actions. Another prob-
lem is that the causal relationships between actions in a
single attacker scenario differ signiﬁcantly from the causal
links between several attackers. For example, cooperation
and correlation allows a group of attackers to perform ac-
tions which are beyond the power or capabilities of a sin-
gle attacker. Moreover, in Section 3, we will show that a
group of attackers can perfectly cooperate without showing
any correlation between single attackers’ actions. For exam-
ple, a malicious group can divide a large task into a set of
independent subtasks so that each subtask does not corre-
late with the other tasks.
The method we propose tries to solve these problems
by building a cooperation graph which includes all users
who, in some way or another, cooperate with each other,
i.e. the maximal malicious group of cooperating users in-
cluding not only the executers of the attack but also their
assistants.
The paper proposes a formal method and an algorithm
for detecting action interference between users. It has to be
pointed out that some members of a malicious group may
not necessarily perform illegal actions, for example they can
prepare and organize an attack without taking active part in
the actual attack execution. In addition, members of a mali-
cious group may not necessarily know each other.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces a
formal model of distributed monitoring. Section 3 discusses
different types of malicious cooperation and their detection.
A formal model of coordination detection is proposed in
Section 4. Section 5 describes a detection algorithm and its
implementation. Finally, Section 6 completes the paper with
an analysis of coordination graphs.
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2. DISTRIBUTED MONITORING
2.1. Formal setting
A distributed system consists of a set of agents (includ-
ing both human and software) and a set of passive objects.
The agents produce events by performing actions on objects
and other agents. All actions in a system can be totally or-
dered [24], and the history of the system is represented as a
sequence of actions called system trace:
t = t1, t2, t3, ..., tm−1, tm, ...
The starting and the ﬁnishing time of each action tm are de-
noted respectively by s(tm) and f(tm).The system trace is
totally ordered:
s(tk) < s(tm) for all k < m
An action could be either individual or collective and
it moves the system from one state to another. The sys-
tem state is the collection of all volatile, permanent, and
semi-permanent data of the system at a speciﬁc time [32].
Let S = {S1, S2...} denote the set of system states, U =
{u1, u2, ..., un} stand for a ﬁnite set of agents, and Ai be
the set of actions available to agent ui.
The system state is described with a complete set of
ground literals. The joint action space is A = A1×A2×...×
An. That is, each joint action a¯ = (a1, a2, ..., an), ai ∈ Ai,
is a combination of individual actions performed simultane-
ously by each of the agents. Throughout this paper, we as-
sume that an agent can perform at most one action at a time.
Some of the actions could be , a null or no-op action. We
assume that  ∈ Ai for i = 1, ..., n. In other words, some
agents could be idle at some moments.
In the paper, we follow the STRIPS action representa-
tion augmented with a concurrent action list to handle con-
current actions [2]. Each action, individual or joint, is de-
scribed by a set of preconditions and a set of postconditions.
Figure 1 shows a generic action schema representing a class
of actions. When an action schema is instantiated, all vari-
ables must be bound to constants. That is, an action is a fully
instantiated action schema.
Given a state s, a joint action a¯ = (a1, a2, ..., an) can be
executed iff the preconditions of all elements of a¯ are satis-
ﬁed in s. The resulting state is obtained by taking the union
of the postconditions of each of the elements of a¯ and ap-
plying it to s. This implies that the pre- and postconditions
of the elements of a¯ are jointly satisﬁable. The concurrent
action list is a list of action schemata and negated action
schemata, specifying which actions must be simultaneously
executed or not executed for a given action to have its in-
tended effect.
In the paper, we restrict our attention only to actions with
fully observable effects. That is, whenever an action occurs,
action <ﬁrst-order predicate>
:parameters
<list-of-free-variables>
:preconditions
<conjuctive-list-of-predicates>
:concurrent <conjuctive-list-of-action-names>
:postconditions <conjuctive-list-of-predicates>
Figure 1. Action schema
it is clear what the action is. We use agents(a¯) to denote
the agents involved in a joint action a¯, i.e, the agents per-
forming non-epsilon actions.
The sequence of actions, including epsilon actions, per-
formed by agent uk is called the agent uk trace:
tk = ak1 , a
k
2 , ..., a
k
m, ...
Apparently, each agent trace is a subsequence of the sys-
tem trace. In the paper, we address the question of moni-
toring a system of agents, called the target, for malicious
cooperation. The target could involve both human and soft-
ware agents, the threads of the software agents, the hosts
on which agents execute, etc. Monitoring an active subject
means analyzing the system trace of the subject.
Deﬁnition 1 (Filter of traces) The function F [P ] maps a
trace t to a subtrace t′ that satisﬁes the predicate P .
For example, if P = {agent(ak) = u1}, then F [P ](t) is
the agent u1 trace. Our deﬁnition of ﬁlter is a generaliza-
tion of the deﬁnition provided by Ko et al. [23]. They de-
ﬁne the predicate P on the set of a single action attributes,
whereas in our deﬁnition, P is deﬁned on the overall se-
quence of actions. The major advantage of our deﬁnition is
that it allows us to ﬁlter traces based on inter-action corre-
lation which was not possible with the previous deﬁnition.
One of the goals of this paper is to deﬁne a set of pred-
icates that can be used for detecting correlation among ac-
tions in the system trace. In other words, for a given corre-
lation predicate P , the ﬁlter F [P ] returns all subtraces that
satisfy the correlation pattern deﬁned by the predicate.
3. TYPES OF COOPERATION AND THEIR
DETECTION
Our detection model is based on the idea that in order
to identify a malicious group, one should be able to detect
links, relationships, and cooperation between the members
of the group. In general, there are two main reasons to co-
operate:
Reason A: Cooperation allows attackers to perform ac-
tions which are beyond the power or capabilities of a
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single attacker. That is, cooperation allows a group of
attackers acting together to achieve what single attack-
ers cannot achieve by acting alone.
Reason B: Even when an attacker is capable of executing
his tasks alone, cooperation allows attackers to achieve
their goals better, i.e. it could decrease costs, improve
quality, increase speed, etc.
In general, one could identify two types of cooperation:
Cooperation through action correlation in which
agents’ actions interfere with one another. A particu-
lar type of interference occurs when an agent can per-
form an action that enables a future action to be
performed by another agent who is otherwise inca-
pable of enabling it. For example, an insider could
start a XWindows server which can be used by an out-
sider to start a XWindows attack [9]. The XWindows
exploit is based on a XTest protocol vulnerabil-
ity that allows an outside agent to create a one-way
tunnel into a network from the outside, and gain con-
trol over the network. In this example, the insider
enables the outsider to exploit a vulnerability.
Cooperation through task correlation in which agents
actions do not interfere with one another. Instead, co-
operation is achieved by dividing a large task into a
set of independent subtasks:
T1 ∧ T2 ∧ ... ∧ Tk → T
In this case, the execution of tasks T1, T2, ..., Tk im-
plies task T . Apparently, each subtask can be assigned
to a different attacker who can execute it independently
of other attackers. As an example, consider parallel
port scanning in which, in order to avoid detection, a
large set of ports is divided into small subsets, each
subset being assigned to a different attacker.
In this paper, we study cooperation of type A, and detec-
tion through action correlation. There are several reasons
for constraining our framework. First, the problem is ex-
tremely difﬁcult to be generally approached, and there is no
indication that a general solution exists.
Second, cooperation through task correlation is difﬁcult
to discover. It is often the case that sensor data is insufﬁ-
cient to ﬁnd correlation between agents’ tasks. Detecting
task correlation requires information about agents’ goals
and intentions. Agents’ intentions are, in general, not di-
rectly observable and a system trace could be intentionally
ambiguous. The problem is further complicated by the pres-
ence of a strategic adversary who is aware that he has been
monitored. To illustrate the complexity of the problem, con-
sider an agent who has executed task T1 and task T2. With-
out additional information, it is impossible to differentiate
between the following cases:
• The agent’s intention was to execute both T1 and T2.
• The agent intended to execute only T1. Task T2 was ex-
ecuted as a “noise” with the intention of confusing the
detection system.
• T2 was intended and T1 was “noise”.
• Both T1 and T2 were “noise”.
An additional problem is that we do not know when an
attacker has achieved his goal. For example, an attacker may
compromise a host for the sole purpose of using it as a plat-
form for a further attack.
Third, type B cooperation only improves efﬁciency,
without extending agents’ capabilities. Apparently, in or-
der to detect such cooperation, one needs a clear under-
standing of agents’ incentives, beneﬁts, and criteria of
efﬁciency. As yet, there are no formal models of hack-
ers’ incentives in computer and network security.
In cooperation through action correlation, agents’ ac-
tions interfere with one another. By interference we mean
the fact that an action can affect the outcome of another ac-
tion. In other words, the intended effect of a single action
may depend on other action(s) taken previously or concur-
rently with the given action. An action performed by a sin-
gle agent or a group of agents could modify the outcome
of an action performed by another group, thereby invalidat-
ing the outcome, or improving it.
In general, we have two types of interference: positive
and negative. Positive interference occurs when one action
enables another action, or improves its results. Negative in-
terference takes place when an action invalidates the result
of another action or merely disables it. Two dimensions of
interference can be identiﬁed: interference between the ac-
tions of the same agent, and interference between actions of
different agents.
We view cooperation between attackers as an interfer-
ence of their actions. The main objective of cooperation is
to avoid negative interference and take advantage of posi-
tive interference between attackers’ actions. This observa-
tion serves as a starting point for cooperation detection. To
detect cooperation between attackers we look for patterns
of forward enabling.
Deﬁnition 2 In forward enabling, a group of agents G
brings about the preconditions of an action to be performed
later by agent ui who is not capable of bringing about the
preconditions by himself.
The idea behind forward enabling is that an agent’s ac-
tions are goal-oriented and form a sequence in which for-
mer actions prepare later actions. If an action is beyond the
capabilities of a single agent, then the agent could ask an-
other agent or group of agents to take the action.
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4. A FORMAL MODEL OF FORWARD EN-
ABLING
Let precond(a) denote the preconditions of action a. In
general, precond(a) is a conjunction of predicates:
precond(a) = p1 ∧ p2 ∧ ... ∧ pk
Agent ui is capable of performing action a
i
m at moment
s(aim) if all preconditions evaluate to true at s(a
i
m). Let
agent i’s trace be:
ai = ai1, a
i
2, ..., a
i
m, ...
Apparently, if agent ui intends to execute action a
i
m at mo-
ment s(aim), the agent must take preliminary actions to
bring about precond(aim). That is, every ground literal in
precond(aim) is a postcondition of some action previously
executed by agent ui:
∀ m precond(aim) ⊆
⋃
f(aik)<s(a
i
m)
postcond(aik) (1)
where f(aik) is the ﬁnishing time of action a
i
k, and s(a
i
m) is
the starting time of action aim. Forward enabling could be
detected when agent ui attempts to perform a
i
m without
preparing for all preconditions in precond(aim). Let
precond(aim) = precond
+(aim) ∧ precond−(aim)
where precond+(aim) are the preconditions brought about
by agent ui, and precond
−(aim) are the remaining precon-
ditions. That is:
precond−(aim)
⋂
(
⋃
f(aik)<s(a
i
m)
postcond(aik)) = ∅
In this case, some other agents must have helped agent ui by
bringing about all remaining preconditions precond−(aim).
To ensure that this is a case of cooperation, we require that
agent ui is not capable of bringing about precond
−(aim).
That is, for every precondition p′ ∈ precond−(aim) there
is no action a′ in the action set Ai of agent ui that brings
about p′:
∀p′ ∈ precond−(aim) a′ ∈ Ai.(p′ ∈ postcond(a′))
To ﬁnd the agents who have helped agent i, for ev-
ery precondition p′ ∈ precond−(aim), we look for agents
who have brought about p′ as a postcondition of one
of their actions taken prior to action aim. That is, agent
uj helped agent ui, if uj brought about some precondition
p′ ∈ precond−(aim). More formally, agent uj helped agent
ui, if the precondition p
′ ∈ precond−(aim) is logically de-
rived from postconditions p1, p2, ..., pn:
p1, p2, ..., pn → p′
and for some pk ∈ {p1, p2, ..., pn} there exists an element
tk of the system trace
t1, t2, ..., tk, ....tm, ...
such that:
(f(tk) < s(aim))∧(pk ∈ postcond(tk))∧(uj ∈ agents(tk))
This observation helps us detect both the helper (agent
uj) and the moment when the help was rendered (moment
f(tk)). If action tk is a joint action , then several agents have
helped agent ui.
With some abuse of notation, we write p′ ∈
postcond(tk) to mean that p′ can be derived from
postcond(tk). Space limitations do not allow us to elab-
orate on the details of matching preconditions with post-
conditions. We assume that there is an underlying reason-
ing mechanism that: (i) derives all logical consequences of
a postcondition, (ii) uniﬁes a postcondition with a precon-
dition through a most general uniﬁer.
It has to be pointed out that, if some agent uj has helped
agent ui, this is not always strong evidence of cooperation.
For example, it could be the case that agents uj and ui have
similar tasks, and agent uj , by executing his task, uninten-
tionally and accidentally helped agent ui.
To rule out such cases we look at agent uj’s trace. If
agent uj’s action tk, taken to help agent ui, is irrelevant to
agent uj , then apparently the sole purpose of this action is
to help. More formally, suppose that the help was rendered
by agent uj by performing action tk. The action tk is irrel-
evant for agent uj if it does not prepare any future action of
agent uj :
to (s(to) > f(tk)) ∧ (uj ∈ agents(to))∧
(precond(to) ∩ postcond(tk) = ∅)
5. DETECTION ALGORITHM AND ITS
IMPLEMENTATION
To illustrate the algorithm, we ﬁrst describe a simple co-
ordinated attack that we have designed and implemented in
RedHat Linux 6.2.
5.1. Coordinated Attack Using the Restore Exploit
in RedHat Linux 6.2
RedHat Linux 6.2 contains a utility for backup/restore
called restore (version 0.4b15-1). The problem with restore
is that it can execute an external program with suid privi-
leges. Restore is used in our exploit by running it in an in-
teractive mode (/sbin/restore -i) [34]. In this mode restore
provides a shell interface that allows a user to move around
the directory tree selecting ﬁles to be restored. To determine
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which shell to execute (rsh, ssh etc.), restore uses an en-
vironmental variable RSH. In our exploit, an attacker sets
RSH=/tmp/execute me, thereby forcing restore to run a non-
privileged program execute me with suid privileges.
The exploit we designed works as follows. The ﬁrst step
includes creating a fake shell ( C code which sets effective
uid and gid to 0, i.e. root, and then executes the shell /bin/sh)
and compiling it somewhere on the system (in our case in
/tmp). Let the source ﬁle of the fake shell and the executable
be called cool.c and cool, respectively. To get root shell ac-
cess to the system, cool should be owned by root and world
executable. The change of ownership can either be done by
root himself or by a program or system utility like restore
which runs external commands with setuid (root) privilege.
If restore is forced to execute a carefully crafted ownership
and permission change script (/tmp/execute me) when it is
setuid, the desired change in ownership of /tmp/cool will be
accomplished.
In our scenario, a group of three attackers try to ex-
ploit the vulnerability in restore. The ﬁrst user is an Insider
with access to most of the programming tools (like compil-
ers and linkers). There are two other attackers, Guest1 and
Guest2, which have guest accounts with very limited access
and utilities at their disposal. Every attacker for some rea-
son or another may not be able or may not be willing to ex-
ecute the entire exploit by himself. The insider might not
be willing to execute the exploit for reasons of avoiding be-
ing caught. Likewise, the guest users cannot exploit the en-
tire vulnerability because they cannot compile /tmp/cool.c
to create /tmp/cool. Therefore, the users need to coordinate
in some way to perform the exploit. The basic idea for coor-
dination is that the insider performs all the preparation for
the exploit, leaving the actual attack to Guest1 and Guest2.
In other words, the Insider writes code for cool.c and ex-
ecute me, and compiles cool.c to produce the fake shell
cool. Having set the environment variable RSH, Guest1 is
waiting for the Insider to produce cool. As soon as cool is
produced Guest1 executes restore by ﬁring the command
/sbin/restore -i. This forces restore to execute execute me.
After that Guest1 waits for 4 seconds to allow restore to
change the permission of /tmp/cool (the fake shell), making
it root owned and world executable. Guest1 exits the sys-
tem as soon as the permissions of the ﬁle /tmp/cool have
been changed. The interesting part is that the Insider and
Guest1 have performed perfectly legal operations; i.e. they
have not tried to overﬂow any buffers, to access anything
they are not supposed to, or to elevate privileges. No harm
was done on the system. The attack has been prepared and
now it is ready to be launched.
After the preparation of the attack, Guest2 observes the
exit of Guest1, and concludes that the preparation has ﬁn-
ished. Guest2 now executes the command /tmp/cool to get
the root shell. The problem is that most IDSs will capture
only the last step of the attack where Guest2 executes cool.
After several experiments with the Linux Security Module
(LSM) [26] and Snare [18], we found that they detect only
the ﬁnal step of the attack, thereby leaving most of the at-
tackers (the Insider and Guest1) and their preparatory ac-
tions undetected.
5.2. Coordination Detection Tool (CDT)
We have built the Coordination Detection Tool (CDT)
which includes an auditing tool, a rule based Intrusion de-
tection system, and a system for detecting and identifying
malicious groups and malicious cooperation. CDT has a for-
ward enabling coordination detection algorithm and a back-
ward changing algorithm built into it for detecting malicious
cooperation.
CDT is built on top of the Linux Security Module for
Linux (LSM) [26]. LSM monitors the execution of sys-
tem calls in the Linux kernel and builds corresponding logs.
LSM also provides C2-style (Sun’s Basic Security Module
[38]) log records for Linux systems. However, the auditing
of LSM is very awkward, producing huge irrelevant logs
generated by even simple user actions.
CDT uses the logging facility provided by LSM. CDT
tracks each and every request sent to the kernel in the form
of a system call and logs it, if the call falls in the class of
events CDT is conﬁgured to log. CDT has its own audit-
ing tool which allows for purging unwanted records from
the log ﬁle, and aggregating low-level records into more ab-
stract records. This reduces signiﬁcantly the volume of data,
thereby allowing all detection algorithms to work on selec-
tively chosen and small datasets. For example, CDT can be
conﬁgured to track speciﬁc users, system calls, or relation-
ships between system calls.
The restore exploit executed on a system running LSM
produced almost 1600 records for the duration of the ex-
ploit, which lasted for less than one minute. The CDT tool
ﬁltered all irrelevant logs, thereby reducing the number of
records from 1600 to 250.
5.3. Detecting forward enabling
In this section, we describe an algorithm for detecting
forward enabling. Because of space limitations, the algo-
rithm is only schematically sketched using pseudocode in
Figure 2.
The algorithm uses a data structure called a postcondi-
tion list. The postcondition list is an ordered sequence of
quintuples:
< postcondition name, postcondition type, resourse,
created by, used by >
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for every p ∈ PostconditionTable
do if created by ⊂ used by
then for every agent u1 such that
(u1 ∈ created by) ∧ (u1 /∈ used by)
do for every agent u2 such that
(u2 /∈ created by) ∧ (u2 ∈ used by)
do if p /∈ AccessControlList[u2]
then if Helps(u1, u2) does not exist
then create Helps(u1, u2)
else counter(Helps(u1, u2)) =
counter(Helps(u1, u2)) + 1
Figure 2. Detecting forward enabling
The postcondition list represents postconditions of all ac-
tions in the order of their occurrence.
The postcondition list produced by CDT for the re-
store exploit is shown in Table 1. Every postcondi-
tion belongs to a certain class, such as File create,
File Change permission, etc., shown in the second col-
umn of the table. In addition, every postcondition affects
a system resource or a group of resources by chang-
ing their current status (the status of a resource is described
by a list of features and their values). The resources af-
fected by each postcondition are shown in the third column
of Table 1. Every postcondition is also associated with two
sets of users. The set created by includes the users that di-
rectly produced the postcondition, while the set used by
includes the users that directly used it as a precondi-
tion for a future action. To avoid regress, if a postcondition
is a logical consequence of several other postcondi-
tions, only the agents from the last stage of the infer-
ence appear as creators of the precondition. That is, every
postcondition is associated only with its immediate cre-
ators.
After looking at the precondition list in Table 1, the al-
gorithm discovers several cases of cooperation. First, post-
condition p7 is produced by the Insider and used by another
user Guest2. The postcondition is brought about as a result
of compiling cool.c to produce cool. The point is that the
Insider never uses cool again. Instead, cool is needed and
executed by another user Guest2. In search for stronger evi-
dence, the detection algorithm checks whether Guest2 is ca-
pable of producing cool by himself. The algorithm looks up
the linker ld and compiler gcc in the access control list and
ﬁnds that they are accessible only to root and Insider. There-
fore Guest2 needs cool but cannot compile cool.c. To help
him the Insider compiles it, and never uses it again. Obvi-
ously the sole purpose of producing cool is to help Guest2.
The output of the algorithm is a coordination graph. The
nodes in the graph represent agents, and the arcs represent
coordination. There is an arc from agent u1 to agent u2 iff
agent u1 helps agent u2. The arcs are labelled with frequen-
cies showing how many times agent u1 helped agent u2.
The coordination graph corresponding to the restore exploit
is shown in Figure 3.
 Insider
Guest1
Guest2
2
1
1
Figure 3. Coordination Graph
6. ANALYSIS OF COORDINATION
GRAPHS
An attack is deﬁned as a subgraph of a coordination
graph.
Deﬁnition 3 An attack A is a subgraph of a coordination
graph G whose nodes, AN , are the actual attack executers,
and whose edges, AE , are atomic attacks.
The set of the actual attack executers consists of all
agents which directly harm, break, block, or destroy a tar-
get. The attack executers achieve the ﬁnal objective of a
malicious group by taking actions directly on the target. In
most cases, IDSs would classify these actions either as an
anomaly or an attack signature.
The set of actual attack executers is expected to have one
interesting property: the set is reachable from any node of
the coordination graph.
Conjecture 1 If the coordination graph does not include
decoy (fake) attacks, then there is a path from every mem-
ber of the malicious group to at least one attack executer.
Conjecture 1 is based on the assumption that in a coordi-
nated activity, attackers’ actions are linked by a causal re-
lationship in which one action prepares another. Consider a
path in which attacker u1 helps u2, u2 helps u3 and so on.
If the path cannot be extended beyond attacker un, i.e. if
there are no outgoing links from un , then there is no fur-
ther activity to be prepared, and un directly contributes to
the attackers’ goal. That is, he is one of the actual attack ex-
ecuters who participates in the ﬁnal stage of the attack.
Conjecture 1, however, does not hold if the attackers de-
ploy one or more decoy attacks. A decoy attack is an attack
launched for the sole purpose to mislead and confuse IDSs
96
Authorized licensed use limited to: IEEE Xplore. Downloaded on December 25, 2008 at 06:16 from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply.
Name Condition Type Resource Created by Used by
User(SysCall,Command) User(SysCall,Command)
p1 File Change permission /dev/pts/0 guest2(AUE CHMOD,login) Not Found
p2 File Create /dev/null insider(AUE OPEN WTC,bash) Not Found
p3 File Change permission /dev/pts/2 insider(AUE CHMOD,login) Not Found
p4 File Create /tmp/cool.c insider(AUE OPEN WTC,sh) Not Found
p5 File Create /tmp/ccYUGCj0.s insider(AUE OPEN WTC,cc1) Not Found
p6 File Create /tmp/ccbSeKNw.o insider(AUE OPEN WTC,as) Not Found
p7 File Create /tmp/cool insider(AUE OPEN WTC,ld) insider(AUE OPEN RW,ld),
guest2(AUE EXECVE,cool)
p8 File Change permission /tmp/cool guest1(AUE CHMOD,chmod) guest2(AUE EXECVE,cool)
p9 File Create /tmp/execute me insider(AUE OPEN WTC,sh) guest1(AUE EXECVE,execute me)
p10 File Create /tmp/t24603-sh insider(AUE OPEN WTC,sh) Not Found
p11 File Change permission /tmp/execute me insider(AUE CHMOD,chmod) guest1(AUE EXECVE,execute me)
Table 1. Post Condition List
[3]. On one hand, the attack is real in the sense that it aims
at a real target. On the other hand, it is not intended to be ﬁ-
nalized. One can think of a decoy attack as an attack inter-
rupted in the middle of its execution. Obviously, a decoy
attack will produce one or more ”dead ends” in the coordi-
nation graph.
A similar argument leads to the following conjecture.
Conjecture 2 If the coordination graph does not include
decoy (fake) attacks, then any node without outgoing links
corresponds to an actual attack executer.
One drawback of existing intrusion detection systems is
that they can detect only the immediate executers of an at-
tack, and not their assistants, i.e., the agents who prepare the
attack. The assistants are usually the agents who organize,
prepare, and make the attack possible, without taking ac-
tive part in it. We call such agents shadow agents, because
they usually perform legitimate actions that cannot be cap-
tured by current intrusion detection systems. Shadow agents
present a real threat because they remain unrecognized af-
ter the attack, and can prepare and launch future attacks.
Shadow agents are those members of a malicious group
who are located away from the main stream of attack, i.e,
from attack subgraphs.
Deﬁnition 4 The set of shadow agents consists of all agents
s whose distance from the attack subgraph exceeds a cer-
tain domain dependent threshold d0:
min
a∈A
d(s, a) > d0
where the minimum is taken over all members, a, of the at-
tack subgraph, A, (the actual attack executers).
Shadow agents are the opposite of the attack executers who
are directly exposed to detection and prosecution. An agent
could be a shadow member for several reasons. One reason
is to avoid detection. If an attack is detected and investi-
gated, staying away from the main attack stream offers pro-
tection by making it difﬁcult to unravel the conspiracy. Sec-
ond, an agent may not be able to contribute to the attack
preparation and execution due to limited resources, tools,
and capabilities. In this case, staying in the “shadow” is not
a deliberate choice, but the result of one’s own limited abil-
ity to participate actively in the attack.
In the restore attack Guest1 and the Insider are shadow
agents. The attack signature consists of the action per-
formed only by Guest2. Existing intrusion detection sys-
tems, using anomaly or misuse detection, will identify the
attack signature and raise an alert. The problem is that the
attack signature is only part of the attack. The Insider and
Guest1, who prepared the attack by taking legitimate ac-
tions, will remain undetected. The problem can be solved
by ﬁnding a maximal coordination graph. The graph ex-
plains all steps of an attack, starting with its early prepa-
ration, and ﬁnishing with its execution.
Every coordination graph represents an illegal network.
Illegal networks differ from legal networks in several impor-
tant ways. First, participants in illegal networks must con-
duct their activities in secret. The need for secrecy should
lead attackers to create sparse and decentralized coordina-
tion graphs. In order to avoid detection, attackers can de-
ploy a series of “buffers” in which a single task is intention-
ally and artiﬁcially divided into smaller subtasks assigned
to different attackers. The “buffers” decrease the amount of
direct involvement in an attack by replacing a direct coordi-
nation link with a chain of indirect links. Second, attackers
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face a difﬁcult dilemma if they want to design a coordina-
tion graph that maximizes both concealment and efﬁciency.
The problem is that a malicious group of attackers has a
task to accomplish, and these tasks must be performed efﬁ-
ciently.
Coordination graphs can be used in off-line automated
forensics analysis, for discovering attackers’ traces, and in
on-line intrusion detection for neutralizing shadow agents.
In automated forensic analysis, the whole postcondition list
is available, and the algorithm produces a complete coordi-
nation graph. In on-line intrusion detection, the coordina-
tion graph is built incrementally and an instant alert could
be raised as soon as suspicious cooperation is detected. An-
other advantage is that shadow agents can be discovered and
neutralized on-line, i.e., as soon as the main stream of the at-
tack is discovered.
After a potential coalition of agents has been detected, an
automated response can be triggered, depending on the type
of coordination pattern. The model presented in this pa-
per allows for selective generation of responses, commen-
surate with the characteristics of a coordinated attack. For
example, one can apply graph-theoretic measures to ﬁnd
the structure of a malicious group, and to identify the cen-
tral attackers and the peripheral attackers. The concept
of centrality reﬂects an attacker’s position in the coordina-
tion graph. Centrality is the result of how each attacker re-
solves the dilemma of concealment versus coordination. A
central player is actively involved in the coordination and
uses less “buffers” to avoid detection. In contrast, a periph-
eral attacker is only indirectly involved in the preparation of
the attack.
One centrality measure which can be used in intrusion
response is the number of the direct coordination links for
an attacker:
Centrality(ui) =
∑
k∈S
link(ui, uk)
where S is the set of all neighbors of user ui. For exam-
ple, in the coordination graph in Figure 3, the Insider has
centrality 3, whereas the centrality of Guest1 is 1, and the
centrality of Guest2 is 0. The fact that the Insider has the
highest centrality indicates that he plays a central coordi-
nation role. A closer look at the coordination graph reveals
that the Insider is indeed the most powerful user who pre-
pared the major part of the attack.
It has to be pointed out that the notion of centrality is
complimentary to the notion of the immediate attack exe-
cuters. An attacker may be a central player without taking
part in the actual attack execution, as is the case in the co-
ordination graph in Figure 3. An effective intrusion detec-
tion and response requires quick localization and neutral-
ization of both immediate executers and central attackers.
In our example, the ﬁrst two users that have to be neutral-
ized are Guest2 and the Insider.
7. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we studied coordinated attacks and the
problem of detecting malicious networks of attackers. The
paper proposed a formal method and an algorithm for de-
tecting action interference between users. The output of the
algorithm is a coordination graph which includes the maxi-
mal malicious group of attackers including not only the ex-
ecuters of an attack but also their assistants. The paper also
proposed a formal metric on coordination graphs that help
differentiate central from peripheral attackers.
The methods and the algorithms proposed in the paper
can be used in off-line automated forensics analysis, for dis-
covering attackers’ traces, and in on-line intrusion detection
for neutralizing shadow agents and central attackers.
Because the methods proposed in the paper allow for de-
tecting interference between perfectly legal actions, they
can be used for detecting attacks at their early stages of
preparation. For example, coordination graphs can show all
agents and activities directly or indirectly related to suspi-
cious users. This could be potentially useful in systems for
early detection and prevention of attacks against critical in-
frastructures.
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